

Security Testing

Software Engineering
Summer 2017

Andreas Zeller, Saarland University

@AndreasZeller

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Making \$50,000/Month in Security Testing

Software Engineering
Summer 2017

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WIRED

Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It

BUSINESS CULTURE DESIGN GEAR SCIENCE SECURITY TRANSPORTATION

ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 07.21.15 6:00 AM

HACKERS REMOTELY KILL A JEEP ON THE HIGHWAY—WITH ME IN IT

A man stands on the side of a road, holding a laptop and looking at its screen. He is positioned next to a white Jeep Cherokee. Another man is seated in the driver's seat of the car. A large blue play button icon is overlaid on the side of the car, suggesting a video player interface.



Ooops, your files have been encrypted!

English

Payment will be raised on

5/16/2017 00:47:55

Time Left

02:23:57:37

Your files will be lost on

5/20/2017 00:47:55

Time Left

06:23:57:37

[About bitcoin](#)

[How to buy bitcoins?](#)

[Contact Us](#)

What Happened to My Computer?

Your important files are encrypted.

Many of your documents, photos, videos, databases and other files are no longer accessible because they have been encrypted. Maybe you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but do not waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

Can I Recover My Files?

Sure. We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. But you have not so enough time.

You can decrypt some of your files for free. Try now by clicking <Decrypt>.

But if you want to decrypt all your files, you need to pay.

You only have 3 days to submit the payment. After that the price will be doubled.

Also, if you don't pay in 7 days, you won't be able to recover your files forever.

We will have free events for users who are so poor that they couldn't pay in 6 months.

How Do I Pay?

Payment is accepted in Bitcoin only. For more information, click <[About bitcoin](#)>.

Please check the current price of Bitcoin and buy some bitcoins. For more information, click <[How to buy bitcoins](#)>.

And send the correct amount to the address specified in this window.

After your payment, click <[Check Payment](#)>. Best time to check: 9:00am - 11:00am

CMT 6 - 11:00am - 11:00pm

Send \$300 worth of bitcoin to this address:



12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw

Copy

[Check Payment](#)

[Decrypt](#)

Thermostats can now get infected with ransomware, because 2016



by MATTHEW HUGHES — 29 days ago in GADGETS



48

8,825
SHARES



http://thenextweb.com/!

Recommended



5 reasons why wearables are still ruling our wrists (and everywhere else)

Marie-Anne Leuty · 15 hours ago

Most popular



Google Maps now has a 'Catching Pokémons' feature in Timeline

Mix · 1 day ago



Facebook is testing a new Twitter-like feature to boost conversations

Mix · 22 hours ago



The world's first VR ballet experience is absolutely stunning

Juan Buis · 1 day ago



The best Apple Keynotes to watch before Wednesday's iPhone 7 Keynote


Boris Veldhuijzen van Zanten · 1 day ago




Warner Bros. shoots itself in the foot as it flags its own website for piracy

Mix · 1 day ago

The Internet of ransomware things...



Highjacking a Car



Highjacking a Car

- All car components are connected via a bus system (CAN bus)
- Includes engine control, power steering, controls, entertainment system
- Hardware controls tight *access rules* – e.g. entertainment system can only read, not write

Highjacking a Car

1. Connect to *entertainment system via public WiFi access*
2. *Exploit vulnerability* to get control over system
3. *Flash chip* that controls CAN bus access to get full writing capabilities
4. Voilá! Full control over car.

A Simple Vulnerability

```
while ((cc = getch()) != c)
{
    name[j++] = cc;
    ...
}
```

- No checking for length of buffer `name`
- Can overwrite stack with *code* and new *return address* that jumps into *code*

Security by Proof

Systems that are *provably secure* ensure that

- specific attacks are *impossible*
e.g. no buffer overflows, or no SQL injection
- they will always *behave as designed*
e.g. will always produce a correct result

Requires (expensive) mathematical proof

Security by Testing

Systems that are thoroughly *tested* ensure

- *Low probability* of attack success because several attacks already have been tested
- *High complexity* of remaining attacks because simple attacks already have been tested
- Cost-efficient if highly *automated*

Today's Contents

Fuzzing 101

Simple **fuzzing** techniques
generating *random inputs* to programs

Grammar-Based
Fuzzing

Structured fuzzing techniques
using *grammars* and models

Inferring
Grammars

Inferring input grammars
so you can fuzz arbitrary programs

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
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Infinite Monkey Theorem




Random Testing



Fuzzing


Random Testing at the System Level



“ab’d&gfdffgg”

Fuzzing

Random Testing at the System Level



Barton P. Miller

1989 Paper

An Empirical Study of the Reliability of UNIX Utilities

Barton P. Miller
bart@cs.wisc.edu

Lars Fredriksen
L.Fredriksen@att.com

Bryan So
so@cs.wisc.edu

Summary

Operating system facilities, such as the kernel and utility programs, are typically assumed to be reliable. In our recent experiments, we have been able to crash 25-33% of the utility programs on any version of UNIX that was tested. This report describes these tests and an analysis of the program bugs that caused the crashes.

Fuzzing

Random Testing at the System Level



“ab’d&gfdffff”

grep • sh • sed ...

25%–33%

Fuzzer Output

[;x1-GPZ+wcckc];,N9J+?#6^6\le?]9lu2_%'4GX"0VUB[E/r
~fApu6b8<%siq8Zh.6{V,hr?;{Ti.r3PlxMMMv6{xS^+'Hq!
Ax B"YXRS@!Kd6;wtAMefFWM(`IJ_<1~o}z3K(CCzRH JIlvHz>_*.
\>JrlU32~eGP?IR=bF3+;y\$3lodQ< B89!5"W2fK*vE7v{')KC-
i,c{<[~m!]o;{.'}Gj\{X}EtYetrbY@aGZ1{P!AZU7x#4(Rtn!
q4nCwqol^y6}0|Ko=*JK~;zMKV=9Nai:wxu{J&UV#HaU)*BiC<),`
+t*gka<W=Z.%T5WGHZpl30D< Pq>&]BS6R&j?#tP7iaV}-}`\?
[_[Z^LBMPG-FKj'xwuZ1=Q`^`5,\$N\$Q@[!CuRzJ2DlvBy!
^zhdf3C5PAkR?V hnl3='i2Qx]D
\$qs4O`1@fevnG'2\11Vf3piU37@55ap\zlyl"!f,
\$ee,J4Gw:cgNKLie3nx9(`efSlg6#[K" @WjhZ}r[Scun&sBCS,T/[
vY'pduwgzDIVNy7'rnzxNwl)(ynBa>%lb` ;`9fG]P_0hdG~\$@6
3]KAeEnQ7IU)3Pn,0)G/6N-wyzj/MTd#A;r

Fuzzing UNIX utilities

- Use fuzzed output as a prolog prgram:
`$ python fuzzer.py | prolog`
- Use fuzzed output as an input to grep:
`$ python fuzzer.py | grep x`
- Use fuzzed output as a TeX document:
`$ python fuzzer.py | tex`

Demo

fuzzer.py

```
import random

def fuzzer():
    # Strings up to 1024 characters long
    string_length = int(random.random() * 1024)

    # Fill it with ASCII 32..128 characters
    out = ""
    for i in range(0, string_length):
        out += chr(int(random.random() * 96 + 32))
    return out

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print fuzzer()
```

Results

Utility	VAX (v)	Sun (s)	HP (h)	i386 (x)	AIX 1.1 (a)	Sequent (d)
adb	•○	•	•	○	-	-
as	•			•	•	•
awk						
bc			-	•○		
bib			-	-	-	-
calendar				-		
cat						
cb	•		•	•	○	•
cc						
/lib/ccom				-	-	•
checkeq				-		
checknr				-	-	
col	•○	•	•	•○	•	•
colcrt				-	-	
colrm				-	-	
comm						
compress					-	
/lib/cpp						
ed						

deroff	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
dition	•	-	-	-	-	-	•
diff							
ditroff	•○	•	-	-	-	-	-
dtbl			-	-	-	-	-
emacs	•	•	○	-	-	-	-
eqn		•	•	•	•	-	-
expand					-	-	-
f77	•	-	-	-	-	-	-
fmt							
fold					-	-	-
ftp	•	•	•	-	•	-	•
graph						-	-
grep							-
grn			-	-	-	-	-
head			-	-	-	-	-
ideal			-	-	-	-	-
indent	•○	•○	•	-	-	-	•
join		⊕					
latex			-	-	-	-	-
lex	•	•	•	•	•	-	•
lint		-					-
lisp							-
look	•	○	•	•	•	-	•

Results

Utility	VAX (v)	Sun (s)	HP (h)	i386 (x)	AIX 1.1 (a)	Sequent (d)
adb	●○	●	●	○	-	-
as	●			●	●	●
awk						
bc			-	●○		
bib			-	-	-	
calendar			-	-		
cat						
cb	●		●	●	○	●
cc						
/lib/ccom				-	-	
checkeq				-	-	
checknr				-	-	
col	●○	●	●	●○	●	●
colcrt			-	-		
colrm			-	-		
comm						
compress				-		
/lib/cpp						
csh	●○	○	○	-	○	○
dbx		*	-	-		
dc				○		
deqn		●	-	-	-	
deroff	●	●	●	-	●	●
diction	●	-	●	-	-	
diff						
ditroff	●○	●	-	-	-	
dtbl			-	-	-	
emacs	●	●	○	-	-	
eqn	●	●	●	-		
expand				-		
f77	●		-	-	-	
fmt						
fold				-		
ftp	●	●	●	-	●	●
graph				-		
grep			-	-	-	
grn			-	-	-	
head				-		
ideal			-	-	-	
indent	●○	●○	●	-	-	●
join		⊕		-	-	
latex			-	-	-	
lex	●	●	●	●	●	●
lint						
lisp		-	-	-	-	
look	●	○	●	●	-	●

Table 2: List of Utilities Tested and the Systems on which They Were Tested (part 1)

● = utility crashed, ○ = utility hung, * = crashed on SunOS 3.2 but not on SunOS 4.0,

⊕ = crashed only on SunOS 4.0, not 3.2. - = utility unavailable on that system.

! = utility caused the operating system to crash.

Utility	VAX (v)	Sun (s)	HP (h)	i386 (x)	AIX 1.1 (a)	Sequent (d)
m4					●	
mail						
make					●	
more						-
nm						
nroff					●	
pc					-	
pic					-	
plot	-		○	●	-	-
pr						
prolog	●○	●○	●○	-	-	-
psdit					-	
ptx	-	●	●	○	○	○
refer	●	*	●	-	-	!●
rev					-	
sed					-	
sh					-	
soelim						
sort						
spell	●○	●	●	○	●	●
spline					-	
split					-	
sql					-	
strings					-	
strip						
style	●	-	●		-	
sum						
tail						
tbl						
tee						
telnet	●	●	●	-	●	○
tex					-	-
tr					-	
troff	-				-	
tsort	●	*	●	●	●	●
ul	●	●	●	-	-	●
uniq	●	●	●	●	●	●
units	●○	●	●	●	●	●
vgrind	●			-	-	
vi	●		●	-		
wc						
yacc						
# tested	85	83	75	55	49	73
# crashed/hung	25	21	25	16	12	19
%	29.4%	25.3%	33.3%	29.1%	24.5%	26.0%

Table 2: List of Utilities Tested and the Systems on which They Were Tested (part 2)

● = utility crashed, ○ = utility hung, * = crashed on SunOS 3.2 but not on SunOS 4.0,

⊕ = crashed only on SunOS 4.0, not 3.2. - = utility unavailable on that system.

! = utility caused the operating system to crash.

Reasons for Crashes

- Pointers and arrays
- Not checking return codes
- And more...

Pointers and Arrays

```
while ((cc = getch()) != c)
{
    string[j++] = cc;
    ...
}
```

Not checking Return Codes

```
char rdc()
{
    char lastc;

    do {
        lastc = getchar();
    } while (lastc != ' ' ||
              lastc != '\t');

    return (lastc);
}
```

And more...

- Send "!o%88888888f" as command to the csh command-line shell
- Invoke this with string = "%88888888f":

```
char *string = ...  
printf(string);
```

Safe Coding

- Check all array references for valid bounds
- Apply bounds on all inputs
- Check all system call return values
- Never trust third-party inputs

...all of which is supported by modern languages
...but there are newbie programmers born every minute

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so you can fuzz arbitrary programs

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
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
Grammar Fuzzing

- Suppose you want to test a *parser* – to compile and execute a program




Parser

Grammar Fuzzing



Grammar Fuzzing





LangFuzz



- Fuzz tester using a full-fledged *grammar* to generate inputs
- Can be parametrized with a *grammar*
- Can use grammar to *parse existing inputs*

JavaScript as Domain



- If an attacker gains control over the *JavaScript interpreter*, he gains control over the *entire browser*

JavaScript Grammar

Fuzzing
JavaScript

Sample
Code

Language
Grammar




Test
Suite



Mutated Test



Test Driver



JavaScript Grammar

If Statement

IfStatement^{full} ⇒

 | **if** ParenthesizedExpression Statement^{full}

 | **if** ParenthesizedExpression Statement^{noShortIf} **else** Statement^{full}

IfStatement^{noShortIf} ⇒ **if** ParenthesizedExpression Statement^{noShortIf} **else** Statement^{noShortIf}

Switch Statement

SwitchStatement ⇒

 | **switch** ParenthesizedExpression { }

 | **switch** ParenthesizedExpression { CaseGroups LastCaseGroup }

CaseGroups ⇒

 «empty»

 | CaseGroups CaseGroup

CaseGroup ⇒ CaseGuards BlockStatementsPrefix

LastCaseGroup ⇒ CaseGuards BlockStatements

CaseGuards ⇒

 | CaseGuard

 | CaseGuards CaseGuard

CaseGuard ⇒

Fuzzing with Grammars

- Want to encode a *grammar* to produce arithmetic expressions as *strings*
- \$START expands into \$EXPR, which can expand into \$TERM, \$EXPR + \$TERM, etc.

```
$START    ::= $EXPR
$EXPR     ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM      ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR   ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
              $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER  ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
$DIGIT    ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
```

Fuzzing with Grammars

\$START



```
$START      ::= $EXPR
$EXPR       ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM       ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR     ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
                  $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER    ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
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```

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
\$EXPR



```
$START   ::= $EXPR
$EXPR    ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM    ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR  ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
             $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
$DIGIT   ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
```

Fuzzing with Grammars

\$EXPR + \$TERM



```
$START   ::= $EXPR
$EXPR    ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM    ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR  ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
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```

Fuzzing with Grammars


\$EXPR + \$FACTOR



```
$START   ::= $EXPR
$EXPR    ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM    ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR  ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
             $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
$DIGIT   ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
```

Fuzzing with Grammars

\$TERM + \$FACTOR



```
$START ::= $EXPR
$EXPR ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
           $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
$DIGIT ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
```

Fuzzing with Grammars

\$FACTOR + \$FACTOR



```
$START   ::= $EXPR
$EXPR    ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM    ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR  ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
             $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
$DIGIT   ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
```

Fuzzing with Grammars

\$FACTOR + \$INTEGER



```
$START   ::= $EXPR
$EXPR    ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM    ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
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```

Fuzzing with Grammars

\$INTEGER + \$INTEGER



```
$START   ::= $EXPR
$EXPR    ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM    ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR  ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
             $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
$DIGIT   ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
```

Fuzzing with Grammars

\$DIGIT + \$INTEGER

```
$START    ::= $EXPR
$EXPR     ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM      ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR   ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
              $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER  ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
$DIGIT    ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
```



Fuzzing with Grammars

2 + \$INTEGER



```
$START   ::= $EXPR
$EXPR    ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM    ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR  ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
             $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
$DIGIT   ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
```

Fuzzing with Grammars

2 + 2



```
$START   ::= $EXPR
$EXPR    ::= $EXPR + $TERM | $EXPR - $TERM | $TERM
$TERM    ::= $TERM * $FACTOR | $TERM / $FACTOR | $FACTOR
$FACTOR  ::= +$FACTOR | -$FACTOR | ($EXPR) |
             $INTEGER | $INTEGER.$INTEGER
$INTEGER ::= $INTEGER$DIGIT | $DIGIT
$DIGIT   ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
```

JavaScript Grammar

If Statement

IfStatement^{full} ⇒

 | **if** ParenthesizedExpression Statement^{full}

 | **if** ParenthesizedExpression Statement^{noShortIf} **else** Statement^{full}

IfStatement^{noShortIf} ⇒ **if** ParenthesizedExpression Statement^{noShortIf} **else** Statement^{noShortIf}

Switch Statement

SwitchStatement ⇒

 | **switch** ParenthesizedExpression { }

 | **switch** ParenthesizedExpression { CaseGroups LastCaseGroup }

CaseGroups ⇒

 «empty»

 | CaseGroups CaseGroup

CaseGroup ⇒ CaseGuards BlockStatementsPrefix

LastCaseGroup ⇒ CaseGuards BlockStatements

CaseGuards ⇒



 | CaseGuard

 | CaseGuards CaseGuard

CaseGuard ⇒


A Generated Input

```
1 var haystack = "foo";  
2 var re_text = "^foo";  
3 haystack += "x";  
4 re_text += "(x)";  
5 var re = new RegExp(re_text);  
6 re.test(haystack);  
7 RegExp.input = Number();  
8 print(RegExp.$1);
```



defects

Fuzzing JavaScript



Christian Holler



Automatic Production

- Implement production in Python
- Start with \$START, apply rules randomly

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
# Grammar-based Fuzzing

import random

term_grammar = {
    "$START": [
        ["$EXPR"],
    ],

    "$EXPR": [
        ["$EXPR + $TERM", "$EXPR - $TERM", "$TERM"],
    ],

    "$TERM": [
        ["$TERM * $FACTOR", "$TERM / $FACTOR", "$FACTOR"],
    ],

    "$FACTOR": [
        ["+$FACTOR", "-$FACTOR", "($EXPR)", "$INTEGER",
        "$INTEGER.$INTEGER"],
    ],

    "$INTEGER": [
        ["$INTEGER$DIGIT", "$DIGIT"],
    ],

    "$DIGIT": [
        ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9"]
    ]
}
```

Grammar Encoding

Demo

grammar-fuzz.py

- Want to encode a *grammar* to produce arithmetic expressions as *strings*
- \$START expands into \$EXPR, which can expand into \$TERM, \$TERM + \$TERM, etc.

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
# Grammar-based Fuzzing

import random

term_grammar = {
    "$START":
        ["$EXPR"],

    "$EXPR":
        ["$EXPR + $TERM", "$EXPR - $TERM", "$TERM"],

    "$TERM":
        ["$TERM * $FACTOR", "$TERM / $FACTOR", "$FACTOR"],

    "$FACTOR":
        ["+$FACTOR", "-$FACTOR", "($EXPR)", "$INTEGER",
    "$INTEGER.$INTEGER"],

    "$INTEGER":
        ["$INTEGER$DIGIT", "$DIGIT"],

    "$DIGIT":
        ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9"]
}
```

```
"$EXPR":  
    ["$EXPR + $TERM", "$EXPR - $TERM", "$TERM"],  
  
"$TERM":  
    ["$TERM * $FACTOR", "$TERM / $FACTOR", "$FACTOR"],  
  
"$FACTOR":  
    ["+$FACTOR", "-$FACTOR", "($EXPR)", "$INTEGER",  
"$INTEGER.$INTEGER"],  
  
"$INTEGER":  
    ["$INTEGER$DIGIT", "$DIGIT"],  
  
"$DIGIT":  
    ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9"]  
}
```

```
def apply_rule(term, rule):  
    (old, new) = rule  
    # We replace the first occurrence;  
    # this could also be some random occurrence  
    return term.replace(old, new, 1)
```

```
MAX_SYMBOLS = 5  
MAX_TRIES = 500
```

```
def produce(grammar):
    term = "$START"
    tries = 0

    while term.count('$') > 0:
        # All rules have the same chance;
        # this could also be weighted
        key = random.choice(grammar.keys())
        repl = random.choice(grammar[key])
        new_term = apply_rule(term, (key, repl))
        if new_term != term and new_term.count('$') <
MAX_SYMBOLS:
            term = new_term
            tries = 0
        else:
            tries += 1
            if tries >= MAXTRIES:
                assert False, "Cannot expand " + term

    return term

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print(produce(html_grammar))
```


Today's Contents

Fuzzing 101

Simple **fuzzing** techniques
generating *random inputs* to programs

Grammar-Based
Fuzzing

Structured fuzzing techniques
using *grammars* and models

Inferring
Grammars

Inferring input grammars
so you can fuzz arbitrary programs

Today's Contents

Fuzzing 101

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so you can fuzz arbitrary programs


Creating Grammars

```
URL ::= PF  
AUTHORITY  
PROTOCOL :  
USERINFO :  
HOST ::= /  
PORT ::= /  
PATH ::= /  
QUERY ::= /  
REF ::= /
```

```
Y] ['#' REF]
```



Learning Grammars



Höschele, Zeller "Mining Input Grammars from Dynamic Taints", ASE 2016

Learning Grammars

`http://user:pass@www.google.com:80/path`



Program

Learning Grammars

`http://user:pass@www.google.com:80/path`

`http`

– protocol

Learning Grammars

`http://user:pass@www.google.com:80/path`

`http` – protocol

`www.google.com` – host name

Learning Grammars

`http://user:pass@www.google.com:80/path`

`http` – protocol

`www.google.com` – host name

`80` – port

Learning Grammars

`http://user:pass@www.google.com:80/path`

`http` – protocol

`www.google.com` – host name

`80` – port

`user pass` – login

Learning Grammars

`http://user:pass@www.google.com:80/path`

`http` – protocol

`www.google.com` – host name

`80` – port

`user pass` – login

`path` – page request

Learning Grammars

http://user:pass@www.google.com:80/path

- http – protocol
- www.google.com – host name
- 80 – port
- user pass – login
- path – page request
- :// : @ : / – terminals

Learning Grammars

http://user:pass@www.google.com:80/path

http

– protocol

www.google.com

– host name

80

– port

user pass

– login

path

– page request

:// : @ : /

– terminals

processed
in *different*
functions

stored in
different
variables

http :// user:password@www.google.com:80 /command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| .....  
param: protocol  
| .....  
param: host  
| .....  
param: port  
| .....  
param: authority  
| .....  
param: userinfo  
| .....  
param: path  
| .....  
param: query  
| .....  
param: ref  
| .....
```

`http://user:password@www.google.com:80/command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment`

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| ...
param: protocol
| http ...
param: host
| ...
param: port
| ...
param: authority
| ...
param: userinfo
| ...
param: path
| ...
param: query
| ...
param: ref
| ...
```

`http://user:password@www.google.com:80/command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment`

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| . . . . .
param: protocol
| http . . . . .
param: host
| www.google.com . . . . .
param: port
| . . . . .
param: authority
| . . . . .
param: userinfo
| . . . . .
param: path
| . . . . .
param: query
| . . . . .
param: ref
| . . . . .
```

http ://user:password@www.google.com:80 /command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| .....  
param: protocol  
| http .....  
param: host  
| .....www.google.com.....  
param: port  
| .....  
param: authority  
| .....  
param: userinfo  
| .....user:password.....  
param: path  
| .....  
param: query  
| .....  
param: ref  
| .....
```

`http://user:password@www.google.com:80 /command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment`

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| ...
param: protocol
| http ...
param: host
| www.google.com ...
param: port
| 80 ...
param: authority
| ...
param: userinfo
| user:password ...
param: path
| ...
param: query
| ...
param: ref
| ...
```

```
http://user:password@www.google.com:80 /command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment
```

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| .....  
param: protocol  
| http .....  
param: host  
| .....www.google.com.....  
param: port  
| ..... 80 .....  
param: authority  
| .....  
param: userinfo  
| ..... user:password .....  
param: path  
| ..... /command .....  
param: query  
| .....  
param: ref  
| .....
```

```
http://user:password@www.google.com:80 /command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment
```

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| ...
param: protocol
| http ...
param: host
| www.google.com ...
param: port
| 80 ...
param: authority
| ...
param: userinfo
| user:password ...
param: path
| /command ...
param: query
| foo=bar&lorem=ipsum ...
param: ref
| ...
```

```
http://user:password@www.google.com:80 /command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment
```

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| ...
param: protocol
| http ...
param: host
| www.google.com ...
param: port
| 80 ...
param: authority
| ...
param: userinfo
| user:password ...
param: path
| /command ...
param: query
| foo=bar&lorem=ipsum ...
param: ref
| fragment
```

```
http://user:password@www.google.com:80/command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment
```

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| ...
param: protocol
| http ...
param: host
| www.google.com ...
param: port
| 80 ...
param: authority
| user:password@www.google.com:80 ...
param: userinfo
| user:password ...
param: path
| /command ...
param: query
| foo=bar&lorem=ipsum ...
param: ref
| fragment
```

```
http://user:password@www.google.com:80/command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment
```

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| http•••user:password@www.google.com:80/command•foo=bar&lorem=ipsum•fragment
param: protocol
| http
param: host
| .....www.google.com
param: port
| .....80
param: authority
| .....user:password@www.google.com:80
param: userinfo
| .....user:password
param: path
| ...../command
param: query
| .....foo=bar&lorem=ipsum
param: ref
| .....fragment
```

```
java.net.URL set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| http..... user:password@www.google.com:80/command•foo=bar&lorem=ipsum•fragment
param: protocol
| http..... .
param: host
| ..... www.google.com
param: port
| ..... 80
param: authority
| ..... user:password@www.google.com:80
param: userinfo
| ..... user:password
param: path
| ..... /command
param: query
| ..... foo=bar&lorem=ipsum
param: ref
| ..... fragment
```

URL ::= PROTOCOL '://' AUTHORITY

AUTHORITY ::= USERINFO '@' HOST

```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| http://user:password@www.google.com:80/command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment
param: protocol
| http
param: host
| www.google.com
param: port
| 80
param: authority
| user:password@www.google.com:80
param: userinfo
| user:password
param: path
| /command
param: query
| foo=bar&lorem=ipsum
param: ref
| fragment
```



```
URL ::= PROTOCOL '://' AUTHORITY PATH '?' QUERY '#' REF
AUTHORITY ::= USERINFO '@' HOST ':' PORT
PROTOCOL ::= 'http'
USERINFO ::= 'user:password'
HOST ::= 'www.google.com'
PORT ::= '80'
PATH ::= '/command'
QUERY ::= 'foo=bar&lorem=ipsum'
REF ::= 'fragment'
```

Grammar Inference in Python

- We can track *variables + values* in Python
- We cannot track their dynamic taints
- But we can identify *substrings* of the input

Grammar Inference in Pvthon

- Start with grammar $\$START \rightarrow input$
- For each $(var, value)$ we find during execution, where $value$ is a substring of $input$:
 1. In the grammar, replace all occurrences of $value$ by $\$VAR$
 2. Add a new rule $\$VAR \rightarrow value$

Demo

Tracking

```
# We store individual variable/value pairs here
global the_values
the_values = {}

# The current input string
global the_input
the_input = None

# We record all string variables and values occurring during execution
def traceit(frame, event, arg):
    global the_values
    variables = frame.f_locals.keys()

    for var in variables:
        value = frame.f_locals[var]

        # Save all non-trivial string values that also occur in the input
        if type(value) == type('') and len(value) >= 2 and value in the_input:
            the_values[var] = value

    return traceit

the_input = "..."
sys.settrace(traceit)
program_under_test(the_input)
```

Grammar Expansions

```
# Obtain a grammar for a specific input
def get_grammar(input):
    # Here's our initial grammar
    grammar = {"$START": [input]}

    # We obtain a mapping of variables to values
    global the_input
    the_input = input

    global the_values
    the_values = {}

    sys.settrace(traceit)
    o = urlparse(the_input)
    sys.settrace(None)

    # Now for each (VAR, VALUE) found:
    # 1. We search for occurrences of VALUE in the grammar
    # 2. We replace them by $VAR
    # 3. We add a new rule $VAR -> VALUE to the grammar
    while True:
        new_rules = []
        for var in the_values.keys():
            value = the_values[var]
```

```
# Now for each (VAR, VALUE) found:
# 1. We search for occurrences of VALUE in the grammar
# 2. We replace them by $VAR
# 3. We add a new rule $VAR -> VALUE to the grammar
while True:
    new_rules = []
    for var in the_values.keys():
        value = the_values[var]
        for key in grammar.keys():
            repl_alternatives = grammar[key]
            for j in range(0, len(repl_alternatives)):
                repl = repl_alternatives[j]
                if value in repl:
                    # Found variable value in some grammar nonterminal
                    # Replace value by nonterminal name
                    alt_key = nonterminal(var)
                    repl_alternatives[j] = repl.replace(value, alt_key)
                    new_rules = new_rules + [(var, alt_key, value)]

    if len(new_rules) == 0:
        break # Nothing to expand anymore

    for (var, alt_key, value) in new_rules:
        # Add new rule to grammar
        grammar[alt_key] = [value]

        # Do not expand this again
        del the_values[var]

return grammar
```

Initial Grammar

```
'http://www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de/zeller#ref' ->
$START ::= $SCHEME://$NETLOC$URL#$FRAGMENT
$SCHEME ::= http
$NETLOC ::= www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de
$URL ::= $PATH
$PATH ::= /zeller
$FRAGMENT ::= ref
```

Merging Grammars

- Multiple inputs yield multiple grammars
- *Merge* these grammars to obtain *alternatives*

Demo

Merging Grammars

```
# Merge two grammars G1 and G2
def merge_grammars(g1, g2):
    merged_grammar = g1
    for key2 in g2.keys():
        repl2 = g2[key2]
        key_found = False
        for key1 in g1.keys():
            repl1 = g1[key1]
            for repl in repl2:
                if key1 == key2:
                    key_found = True
                    if repl not in repl1:
                        # Extend existing rule
                        merged_grammar[key1] = repl1 + [repl]

                if not key_found:
                    # Add new rule
                    merged_grammar[key2] = repl2

return merged_grammar
```

Merged Grammars

```
'http://www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de/zeller#ref' ->
$START ::= $SCHEME://$NETLOC$URL#$FRAGMENT
$SCHEME ::= http
$NETLOC ::= www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de
$URL ::= $PATH
$PATH ::= /zeller
$FRAGMENT ::= ref
```

U

```
'https://www.cispa.saarland:80/bar' ->
$START ::= $SCHEME://$NETLOC$URL
$SCHEME ::= https
$NETLOC ::= www.cispa.saarland:80
$URL ::= $PATH
$PATH ::= /bar
```

```
'http://www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de/zeller#ref' ->
$START ::= $SCHEME://$NETLOC$URL#$FRAGMENT
$SCHEME ::= http
$NETLOC ::= www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de
$URL ::= $PATH
$PATH ::= /zeller
$FRAGMENT ::= ref
```

U

```
'https://www.cispa.saarland:80/bar' ->
$START ::= $SCHEME://$NETLOC$URL
$SCHEME ::= https
$NETLOC ::= www.cispa.saarland:80
$URL ::= $PATH
$PATH ::= /bar
```

U

```
'http://foo@google.com:8080/bar?q=r#ref2' ->
$URL ::= $PATH
$START ::= $SCHEME://$NETLOC$URL?$QUERY#$FRAGMENT
$PATH ::= /bar
$QUERY ::= q=r
$NETLOC ::= foo@google.com:8080
$FRAGMENT ::= ref2
$SCHEME ::= http
```

Merged Grammars

Merged grammar →

\$URL ::= \$PATH

\$START ::= \$SCHEME://\$NETLOC\$URL#\$FRAGMENT |
\$SCHEME://\$NETLOC\$URL | \$SCHEME://\$NETLOC\$URL?\$QUERY|\$FRAGMENT

\$PATH ::= /zeller | /bar

\$QUERY ::= q=r

\$NETLOC ::= www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de |
www.cispa.saarland:80 | foo@google.com:8080

\$FRAGMENT ::= ref | ref2

\$SCHEME ::= http | https

Fuzzing

Fuzzing ->

<https://www.cispa.saarland:80/zeller>

<https://www.cispa.saarland:80/bar#ref>

<http://www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de/zeller#ref2>

<http://www.cispa.saarland:80/bar#ref>

<https://www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de/zeller#ref>

<http://foo@google.com:8080/bar>

<http://www.cispa.saarland:80/bar#ref>

<https://www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de/bar#ref2>

<http://www.st.cs.uni-saarland.de/zeller#ref>

...

INI Files


```
[Application]
Version = 0.5
WorkingDir = /tmp/mydir/
[User]
User = Bob
Password = 12345
```



```
INI ::= LINE+
LINE ::= SECTION_LINE '\r'
      | OPTION_LINE  ['\r']
SECTION_LINE ::= '[' KEY ']'
OPTION_LINE ::= KEY ' = ' VALUE
KEY ::= /[a-zA-Z]*/
VALUE ::= /[a-zA-Z0-9\/]/
```

JSON Input

```
{  
  "v": true,  
  "x": 25,  
  "y": -36,  
  ...  
}
```



```
JSON ::= VALUE  
VALUE ::= JSONOBJECT | ARRAY | STRINGVALUE |  
       TRUE | FALSE | NULL | NUMBER  
TRUE ::= 'true'  
FALSE ::= 'false'  
NULL ::= 'null'  
NUMBER ::= '-' /[0-9]+/  
STRINGVALUE ::= '"' INTERNALSTRING '"'  
INTERNALSTRING ::= / [a-zA-Z0-9 ]+/  
ARRAY ::= '['  
        [VALUE ',', ' VALUE]+]  
        ']'  
JSONOBJECT ::= '{'  
           [STRINGVALUE ': ' VALUE  
            [', ' STRINGVALUE ': ' VALUE]  
            +]  
           '}'
```

AUTOGRAM

Grammars

- give insights into the *structure of inputs*
 - reverse engineering
 - writing tests
 - writing parsers
- first technique to mine input grammars from programs

fully automatic • scalable • practical

Fuzzing File

The screenshot shows a web browser window displaying the Wikipedia article 'List of file formats'. The browser interface includes a toolbar at the top with various icons, a address bar showing 'en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_formats', a title bar 'List of file formats - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia', and a user menu 'Not logged in Talk Contributions Create account Log in'. The main content area features the Wikipedia logo and the page title 'List of file formats'. Below the title, it says 'From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia'. A note states: 'This is a dynamic list and may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness. You can help by expanding it with reliably sourced entries.' It also mentions 'See also: List of filename extensions'. The text explains that the list is organized by type, with examples from Microsoft Windows NT, 95, 98, and Me. It notes that some file formats may be listed twice or more, with an example of the .b file. A sidebar on the left contains links to Main page, Contents, Featured content, Current events, Random article, Donate to Wikipedia, Wikipedia store, Interaction (Help, About Wikipedia, Community portal, Recent changes, Contact page), and Tools (What links here, Related changes, Upload file, Special pages, Permanent link, Page information, Wikidata item). A navigation bar at the bottom of the page includes 'Contents [hide]', '1 Archive and compressed', '1.1 Physical recordable media archiving', '2 Computer-aided Design', '2.1 Computer-aided design (CAD)', and '2.2 Electronic design automation (EDA)'.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_formats

List of file formats - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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List of file formats

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is a dynamic list and may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness. You can help by expanding it with reliably sourced entries.

See also: List of filename extensions

This is a **list of file formats** used by computers, organized by type. **Filename extensions** are usually noted in parentheses if they differ from the **format** name or abbreviation. Many operating systems do not limit filenames to a single extension shorter than 4 characters, as was common with some operating systems that supported the **FAT** file system. Examples of operating systems that do not impose this limit include **Unix-like** systems. Also, **Microsoft Windows NT, 95, 98, and Me** do not have a three character limit on extensions for **32-bit** or **64-bit** applications on **file systems** other than pre-Windows 95/Windows NT 3.5 versions of the **FAT** file system. Some filenames are given extensions longer than three characters.

Some file formats may be listed twice or more. An example is the .b file.

Contents [hide]

1 Archive and compressed

1.1 Physical recordable media archiving

2 Computer-aided Design

2.1 Computer-aided design (CAD)

2.2 Electronic design automation (EDA)

Today's Contents

Fuzzing 101

Simple **fuzzing** techniques
generating *random inputs* to programs

Grammar-Based
Fuzzing

Structured fuzzing techniques
using *grammars* and models

Inferring
Grammars

Inferring input grammars
so you can fuzz arbitrary programs

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Current Research

- Dynamic taints from C and Java programs
- Active + sample-free learning of grammars
- Guiding fuzzing towards code coverage
- Integration with symbolic testing
- Build the *world's best fuzzing platform!*



N. Havrikov




M. Höschele



A. Kampmann

Research Opportunities

- *What is the input language of a program?*
 - How can I leverage input structure to
 - cover
 - understand
 - prevent
 - Hundreds of open issues! (and theses)
- 

Christian Holler





CISPA Saarbrücken



Grammar-Based Fuzzing

```
1 var haystack = "foo";
2 var re_text = "^foo";
3 haystack += "x";
4 re_text += "(x)";
5 var re = new RegExp(re_text);
6 re.test(haystack);
7 RegExp.input = Number();
8 print(RegExp.$1);
```



```
java.net.URL.set(protocol, host, port, authority, userinfo, path, query, ref)
| http://user:password@www.google.com:80/command?foo=bar&lorem=ipsum#fragment
param: protocol
| http
param: host
| www.google.com
param: port
| 80
param: authority
| user:password@www.google.com:80
param: userinfo
| user:password
param: path
| /command
param: query
| foo=bar&lorem=ipsum
param: ref
| fragment
```

```
URL ::= PROTOCOL '://' AUTHORITY PATH '?' QUERY '#' REF
AUTHORITY ::= USERINFO '@' HOST ':' PORT
PROTOCOL ::= 'http'
USERINFO ::= 'user:password'
HOST ::= 'www.google.com'
PORT ::= '80'
PATH ::= '/command'
QUERY ::= 'foo=bar&lorem=ipsum'
REF ::= 'fragment'
```

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{ {
 • inputs
 • code
 • behaviors